You may access my CV here.
I am currently interested in primarily metaphysics and philosophy of religion. My other research interests are Eastern philosophy, Epistemology, and Ethics.
Regarding Metaphysics, I'm mostly interested in thinking about the nature and logic of explanatory relations. For instance, I'm interested in thinking about whether all explanatory relations are determination relations, what the real definitions are (if any) of various explanatory relations (e.g. scientific, causal, grounding, reductive explanations, etc.), the logic of such relations (e.g. whether they're irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, necessitating, distribute over conjunction, etc), and how (if at all) they interact with one another in inter-explanatory chains. I currently have a paper under review on whether explanatory relations distribute over conjunction and its ramifications. Regarding philosophy of religion, I'm interested in arguments for and against the existence of God, their relation to Divine Simplicity, and their relationship with Eastern Philosophical traditions such as philosophical Buddhism and Hinduism.
Most of my research thus far has been in epistemology and philosophy of religion. With respect to epistemology, I've thought mostly about normative issues surrounding the epistemology of disagreement. My Master's thesis focused on the problem of epistemic peer-disagreement, where I advocated for a qualified steadfastness view (that I called "Moderate Steadfastness") which I motivated by way of contemporary epistemic externalism. A summary of this thesis is currently under review. Additionally, I have an article out which investigates what the normative relationship should be like between epistemic novices and experts in a given domain. With respect to analytic philosophy of religion, much of my work has been on Bayesian applications to religious ideas. One of the unique contributions I made (with one of my co-authors) was a synthesis of philosophical Confucian virtue ethics with contemporary psychology, which we subsequently applied towards religious beliefs. For copies of my journal articles, please feel free to email me at [email protected].
Regarding Metaphysics, I'm mostly interested in thinking about the nature and logic of explanatory relations. For instance, I'm interested in thinking about whether all explanatory relations are determination relations, what the real definitions are (if any) of various explanatory relations (e.g. scientific, causal, grounding, reductive explanations, etc.), the logic of such relations (e.g. whether they're irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, necessitating, distribute over conjunction, etc), and how (if at all) they interact with one another in inter-explanatory chains. I currently have a paper under review on whether explanatory relations distribute over conjunction and its ramifications. Regarding philosophy of religion, I'm interested in arguments for and against the existence of God, their relation to Divine Simplicity, and their relationship with Eastern Philosophical traditions such as philosophical Buddhism and Hinduism.
Most of my research thus far has been in epistemology and philosophy of religion. With respect to epistemology, I've thought mostly about normative issues surrounding the epistemology of disagreement. My Master's thesis focused on the problem of epistemic peer-disagreement, where I advocated for a qualified steadfastness view (that I called "Moderate Steadfastness") which I motivated by way of contemporary epistemic externalism. A summary of this thesis is currently under review. Additionally, I have an article out which investigates what the normative relationship should be like between epistemic novices and experts in a given domain. With respect to analytic philosophy of religion, much of my work has been on Bayesian applications to religious ideas. One of the unique contributions I made (with one of my co-authors) was a synthesis of philosophical Confucian virtue ethics with contemporary psychology, which we subsequently applied towards religious beliefs. For copies of my journal articles, please feel free to email me at [email protected].
Journal Articles:
1. "The Extended-Expert-As-Teacher (EEAT) Model: A Defense of De Cruz" in Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy 98 (3): 412-435. 2021.
Abstract: Recently, social epistemologists have sought to establish what the governing epistemic relationship should be between novices and experts. In this paper, I argue for, and expand upon, Helen De Cruz’s expert-as-teacher model. For although this model is vulnerable to significant challenges, I propose that a specifically extended version can sufficiently overcome these challenges (call this the “extended-expert-as-teacher” model, or the “EEAT” model). First, I show the respective weaknesses of three influential models in the literature. Then, I argue the expert-as-teacher model can overcome its weaknesses by adding what I call the "Authority Clause", "Advisor Clause", and "Ex Post Facto Clause" of the EEAT model. After developing a robust account of these clauses, I entertain three major objections. First, I respond to the charge that the EEAT model is little better than the expert-as-authority model. Second, I respond to a double-counting objection. Lastly, I respond to a pragmatic objection from complexity.
2. "Mary and Fátima: A Modest C-Inductive Argument for Catholicism" (with Tyler McNabb) in Perichoresis 18 (5): 55-65. 2020.
Abstract: "C-Inductive arguments are arguments that increase the probability of a hypothesis. This can be contrasted with what is called a P-Inductive argument. A P-inductive argument is an argument that shows the overall probability of a hypothesis to be more probable than not. In this paper, we put forth a C-inductive argument for the truth of the Catholic hypothesis (CH). Roughly, we take CH to be the hypothesis that the core creedal beliefs found within the Catholic Tradition are true. Specifically, we argue that we would expect the Miracle of Fátima on CH, but, we wouldn’t expect it as much on ~CH. In order to establish this thesis, we first discuss the basics of confirmation theory. Second, we give the historical context of the Miracle of Fátima. Third, we briefly survey and then reject two possible non-supernatural explanations of the apparent miracle. Doing this will help make plausible that the Miracle of Fátima is actual evidence that a hypothesis needs to predict. Fourth, we give the details as to why we should expect the Miracle of Fátima more on CH than ~CH. Finally, we argue that miracles that occur in Protestant contexts, generally don’t carry the same evidential weight for a Protestant hypothesis as the Miracle of Fátima carries for CH."
3. "Confucianism and the Liturgy: An Analectical Argument for the High Church Traditions" (with Tyler McNabb) in TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 4 (1). 2020.
Abstract: In Confucian thought, there exists a functional view of rituals in which the participation in ritualistic practices brings about human flourishing. Call this the Confucian Ritual Principle (CRP). Utilizing contemporary psychology, in this paper, we argue for CRP. After linking rituals to human flourishing, we argue that on the hypothesis that Christianity is true, we would expect God to establish highly ritualistic and dogmatic liturgies. Put slightly differently, we argue that we should expect what we call 'high church' on the Christian hypothesis. We then move to engage two objections to our argument. First, we respond to an argument that low church traditions are compatible with CRP. Second, we respond to an objection that argues against the ritual thesis, based on the flourishing of low church traditions.
4. "On the Plausibility of the Papacy: Scaling the Walls of Contemporary Criticisms" Heythrop Journal (online). 2019.
Abstract: Recently, there has been a resurgence of scholarly criticisms regarding the plausibility of the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Papacy. Broadly speaking, these problems include scholarly criticisms of the scriptural passages which Roman Catholic theologians claim support the papacy, historical discrepancies regarding apostolic succession from the Apostle Peter, and a priori intuitions about the moral nature of those who attain Papal Status. In this paper, I respond to these objections by utilizing Swinburne’s C-inductive strategy (Bayesian Confirmation Theory) – found in his text, The Existence of God – and conclude that overall, there is a strong P-Inductive argument for the Papacy.
Abstract: Recently, social epistemologists have sought to establish what the governing epistemic relationship should be between novices and experts. In this paper, I argue for, and expand upon, Helen De Cruz’s expert-as-teacher model. For although this model is vulnerable to significant challenges, I propose that a specifically extended version can sufficiently overcome these challenges (call this the “extended-expert-as-teacher” model, or the “EEAT” model). First, I show the respective weaknesses of three influential models in the literature. Then, I argue the expert-as-teacher model can overcome its weaknesses by adding what I call the "Authority Clause", "Advisor Clause", and "Ex Post Facto Clause" of the EEAT model. After developing a robust account of these clauses, I entertain three major objections. First, I respond to the charge that the EEAT model is little better than the expert-as-authority model. Second, I respond to a double-counting objection. Lastly, I respond to a pragmatic objection from complexity.
2. "Mary and Fátima: A Modest C-Inductive Argument for Catholicism" (with Tyler McNabb) in Perichoresis 18 (5): 55-65. 2020.
Abstract: "C-Inductive arguments are arguments that increase the probability of a hypothesis. This can be contrasted with what is called a P-Inductive argument. A P-inductive argument is an argument that shows the overall probability of a hypothesis to be more probable than not. In this paper, we put forth a C-inductive argument for the truth of the Catholic hypothesis (CH). Roughly, we take CH to be the hypothesis that the core creedal beliefs found within the Catholic Tradition are true. Specifically, we argue that we would expect the Miracle of Fátima on CH, but, we wouldn’t expect it as much on ~CH. In order to establish this thesis, we first discuss the basics of confirmation theory. Second, we give the historical context of the Miracle of Fátima. Third, we briefly survey and then reject two possible non-supernatural explanations of the apparent miracle. Doing this will help make plausible that the Miracle of Fátima is actual evidence that a hypothesis needs to predict. Fourth, we give the details as to why we should expect the Miracle of Fátima more on CH than ~CH. Finally, we argue that miracles that occur in Protestant contexts, generally don’t carry the same evidential weight for a Protestant hypothesis as the Miracle of Fátima carries for CH."
3. "Confucianism and the Liturgy: An Analectical Argument for the High Church Traditions" (with Tyler McNabb) in TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 4 (1). 2020.
Abstract: In Confucian thought, there exists a functional view of rituals in which the participation in ritualistic practices brings about human flourishing. Call this the Confucian Ritual Principle (CRP). Utilizing contemporary psychology, in this paper, we argue for CRP. After linking rituals to human flourishing, we argue that on the hypothesis that Christianity is true, we would expect God to establish highly ritualistic and dogmatic liturgies. Put slightly differently, we argue that we should expect what we call 'high church' on the Christian hypothesis. We then move to engage two objections to our argument. First, we respond to an argument that low church traditions are compatible with CRP. Second, we respond to an objection that argues against the ritual thesis, based on the flourishing of low church traditions.
4. "On the Plausibility of the Papacy: Scaling the Walls of Contemporary Criticisms" Heythrop Journal (online). 2019.
Abstract: Recently, there has been a resurgence of scholarly criticisms regarding the plausibility of the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Papacy. Broadly speaking, these problems include scholarly criticisms of the scriptural passages which Roman Catholic theologians claim support the papacy, historical discrepancies regarding apostolic succession from the Apostle Peter, and a priori intuitions about the moral nature of those who attain Papal Status. In this paper, I respond to these objections by utilizing Swinburne’s C-inductive strategy (Bayesian Confirmation Theory) – found in his text, The Existence of God – and conclude that overall, there is a strong P-Inductive argument for the Papacy.